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I. INTRODUCTION
Academic freedom, a coveted feature of higher education, is the
concept that faculty should be free to perform their essential functions as
professors and scholars without the threat of retaliation or undue administrative influence. The central mission of an academic institution, teaching and research, is well served by academic freedom that allows the
faculty to conduct its work in the absence of censorship or coercion. In
support of this proposition, courts have long held that academic freedom
is a special concern of the First Amendment, granting professors and
faculty members cherished protections regarding academic speech.
As early as 1957, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,1 and as recent as
2006 in Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the Supreme Court has grappled with clarifying academic-freedom protections. In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held
that when public employees make statements in the course of performing
their official duties, they are not insulated by the Constitution from employer discipline.3 Pursuant to Garcetti, it becomes plausible that a faculty member’s expression or speech, at least at a public college or universi* Oren R. Griffin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Mercer University School of Law; B.S.,
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1. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3. Id. at 421.
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ty, would not be entitled to constitutional protection under the First
Amendment and may be the basis for disciplinary action. The ramifications could be significant for academics who speak and write in the
course of performing their official job duties. In the majority opinion,
however, Justice Kennedy attempted to set aside such concerns by stating that the Garcetti holding may not forestall some constitutional protection for professorial speech.4 But the majority opinion only implicates
academic scholarship and classroom instruction as perhaps deserving of
constitutional protection.
At the outset, this article recounts the Garcetti majority opinion and
the accompanying opinions offered by the dissenters. Secondly, the article explores the meaning of academic freedom for individual academics
and faculty as expressed through various judicial decisions, including the
post-Garcetti case law, as well as other higher education advocates.
Next, the article delves into the complexity of academic speech and some
intriguing contemporary examples. Finally, the article discusses the challenges confronting academic-freedom protections going forward and the
opportunity created by the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti. In sum,
this article seeks to address the current state of individual academic freedom at America’s colleges and universities.
II. A VIEW OF THE GARCETTI DECISION
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, Richard Ceballos, a public employee working as a deputy district attorney for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, became embroiled in a dispute with his supervisors regarding the contents of an affidavit that was used to obtain a search warrant critical to a criminal prosecution.5 Ceballos believed that the affidavit included various inaccuracies and misrepresentations and concluded
that the criminal case should be dismissed after receiving an unsatisfactory explanation for the inaccuracies from the warrant affiant, a Los Angeles County deputy sheriff.6
Further, Ceballos submitted his memo and findings to his supervisors, which resulted in a heated discussion about the search warrant and
the merits of the criminal case.7 Despite Ceballos’s contrary recommendation, the criminal prosecution proceeded.8 The defense attorney for the
accused filed a motion challenging the search warrant, and Ceballos was
4. See generally id.
5. Id. at 413.
6. Id. at 414.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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called by the defense to testify regarding the deficiencies within the
search warrant.9 Subsequently, Ceballos claimed that he was subject to a
string of retaliatory employment actions that included an unwanted reassignment and transfer, as well as the denial of a promotion.10 Ceballos
responded by filing a grievance and eventually suing the District Attorney’s Office for violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights.11
The District Attorney’s Office argued that Ceballos’s memo was
not protected speech under the First Amendment because the memo was
written pursuant to his employment duties.12 The district court agreed,
granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.13 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’s memo was protected
speech under the First Amendment pursuant to the reasoning set out in
Pickering v. Board of Education14 because the memo concerned speech
regarding a matter of public concern, i.e., alleged government misconduct.15 The court of appeals did not address whether the speech was
made in Ceballos’s capacity as a private citizen or public employee.16 On
certiorari before the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in the 5–4 decision, reversed, stating the following: “We hold
that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications
from employer discipline.”17
Justice Kennedy indicated that Ceballos wrote the memo because
that was within the scope of his employment.18 “The fact that his duties
sometimes required him to speak and write does not mean his supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance.”19 Further, the
majority observed that job-related expressions outside of a public employee’s official duties were protected by the First Amendment, such as
informed opinions that may be offered by a teacher to a school board on
matters related to school operations.20
9. Id. at 414–15 (the trial court rejected the challenge of the warrant by the defense attorney).
10. Id. at 415.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
15.Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 416.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 421.
18. Id. at 422.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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The Court’s opinion included dissenting responses from Justices
Stevens21 and Breyer,22 with a more extensive response from Justice
Souter.23 Although briefly discussed, Justice Stevens disagreed with the
notion that a categorical difference existed between speaking as a citizen
and speaking in the course of one’s employment.24 Stevens found it immaterial whether a public employee’s speech was made pursuant to one’s
job duties.25 Relying on the Court’s decision in Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District, wherein concerns raised by a teacher about
a school district’s racist employment practices were entitled to First
Amendment protection, Stevens announced that a new rule dependent on
a job description was senseless and misguided.26
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion took note of the complexity that
beset free speech concerns for public-sector employees and employers
generally, and contended that the degree of First Amendment protection
afforded public employees will differ based on the category of speech at
issue.27 Breyer was unable to join the majority, however, because it held
that public employees speaking pursuant to their official duties are never
insulated from employer discipline.28
Finding this position too narrow, Breyer explained that Pickering
balancing—weighing an employee’s free speech interests against an employer’s interests in promoting efficient public service operations—
should apply to public employee speech regarding matters of public concern made in the course of performing job duties.29 Ceballos’s position as
a prosecutor and lawyer obligated him to share exculpatory evidence
with defense counsel, thereby establishing a basis to protect speech offered in the course of performing his job as a deputy district attorney. 30
Breyer indicated that pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,31 Ceballos’s memorandum was entitled to First Amendment protection, and because Ceballos was acting as a lawyer, his speech was subject to examination by
canons of the profession that obviated the need for government authority
to control the public employee’s speech.32
21. Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (citing Givham v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414–16 (1979)).
27. Id. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 446.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
32. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 446 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

2013] Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti

5

Further, Breyer endorsed Pickering, balancing on the facts presented in Garcetti, because professional and special constitutional obligations mandate protection for Ceballos’s employee speech.33 As a lawyer,
Ceballos’s speech was subject to regulation by canons of the profession.34 Also, as a prosecutor, he was required by constitutional obligations to communicate with the defense regarding exculpatory evidence
and scrutinize evidence relied upon by the government.35 Based on these
circumstances, Breyer held that First Amendment protection should be
granted to such employee speech and that Pickering balancing should be
applied. 36
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg
joined, offered a third dissenting opinion indicating that the reach of the
majority’s holding went too far by categorically discounting public employee speech.37 Agreeing that a government employer has a substantial
interest in effectuating its policy objectives, Souter observed that employee speech is not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection.38
Thus, employee speech that represents a distraction or obstacle to the
implementation of lawful public policy may be correctly denied First
Amendment protection.39 Contrary to the majority’s view, however,
Souter argued that Pickering balancing was the proper approach to determine eligibility for First Amendment protection when an employee
speaks critically about his or her employer.40
Souter took specific issue with the categorical bar to First Amendment protection for statements made in the course of performing official
job duties by stating the following:
[T]here is no adequate justification for the majority’s line categorically denying Pickering protection to any speech uttered ‘pursuant
to . . . official duties . . . .’ As all agreed, the qualified speech protection embodied in Pickering balancing resolves the tension between individual and public interests in the speech, on the one hand,
and the government’s interest in operating efficiently without distraction or embarrassment by talkative or headline-grabbing employees.41
33. Id. at 447.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 446–47.
37. Id. at 427 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 428.
39. Id. at 429.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 430.
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Souter, however, further explained that the feasibility of Pickering
balancing is advanced by adjustments that would allow an employee to
prevail only when speaking within the scope of his or her job duties on
matters of unusual importance.42
Also, Souter pointed to the majority’s flawed belief that any public
employee speech constitutes government speech, which requires espousal of a particular policy or substantive position, consistent with the
Court’s previous decisions in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia and Rust v. Sullivan.43 Souter, here, observed that Ceballos was not employed to broadcast a particular message.44 Certainly,
the Los Angeles County District Attorney had an interest in what Ceballos might say as a part of his job, but the speech uttered in the course
of his job duties was not preset or prescribed as found in the Rust decision.45 It is this expansive notion of government speech as a means of
controlling or restricting public employee free expression that may have
troubling consequences for public colleges and universities.46
Souter further opined that the majority’s holding in Garcetti posed
a threat to academic freedom for public university professors who speak
and write pursuant to their official job duties.47 The majority’s opinion
found that the First Amendment does not protect speech or written expression by public employees uttered in the course of performing their
jobs.48 For college and university professors at public institutions, the
Court’s decision left open the question of whether academic freedom
extended under the First Amendment protects faculty speech relative to
teaching and scholarly activities, as well as assessments of administrative
processes such as promotion, tenure, hiring, and the management of institutional resources.49 Moreover, Souter took no comfort in the majority’s argument that public employees may rely on state and federal whistleblower statutes, rather than the First Amendment, to remedy retaliatory disciplinary action unlawfully imposed by their supervisors as a con42. Id. at 435. Justice Souter listed matters such as “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety” that would “weigh out in an
employee’s favor.” Id.
43. Id. at 436 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).
44. Id. at 437.
45. Id. at 438.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 438.
48. Id. at 421 (majority opinion); see also supra text accompanying note 18.
49. Joan DelFattore, To Protect Academic Freedom, Look Beyond the First Amendment, THE
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 31, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/To-Protect-AcademicFreedom/125178/.
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sequence of job-related speech.50 Referring to available whistleblower
statutes as a “patchwork” of definitions and protections, Souter argued
that whistleblower provisions were ill-equipped to address the concerns
that would be raised by public sector employees.51
Arguably, Garcetti denies First Amendment protection to any public employee who speaks within the scope of performing official job duties. Faculty at public colleges and universities, however, enjoy academic
freedom to express themselves on various academic and intellectual topics without the threat of censorship, intimidation, or adverse employment
retaliation. Thus, a conflict may exist as to whether Garcetti’s application undermines academic freedom at colleges and universities. Justice
Kennedy, perhaps in anticipating such conflict, indicated the following in
the Garcetti majority opinion:
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary
employee-speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do
not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in
the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.52

Thus, for those most concerned with Garcetti’s implication for
higher education, the Court left uncertain whether academic freedom
remains a special concern of the First Amendment and the scope of academic-freedom protections available to faculty. Garcetti strikes a strange
chord in light of the Court’s well-settled position that faculty must remain free to pursue scholarship, teach, and “to gain new maturity and
understanding.”53 Such maturity and understanding is gained by speech
and inquiry beyond the campus grounds without fear of reprisal or discipline for commentary that administrators or governmental officials find
objectionable. At the same time, however, academic freedom cannot be a
passcard for mayhem. The challenge is to sustain academic freedom
without surrendering practical administrative controls.
Conceptually, the Garcetti dissenters appear to be correct when
they recognize that categorically denying First Amendment protection to
public employee speech uttered in the course of performing job duties is
fraught with hazards. Pickering balancing, with or without adjustments,
offers a well-reasoned, flexible method to resolve complex First
50. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439 (Souter, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 440.
52. Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
53. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
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Amendment claims because workplace speech and the right to free expression can hardly be understood without consideration of context or
content, as well as the relative interests of the employee and employer.
For professors at public colleges and universities, it may not be feasible
to reconcile traditional academic freedom principles that encourage
scholarly exploration on difficult and sometimes controversial topics
with Garcetti’s categorical “official duties” reasoning.54 Likewise, Pickering balancing, even given its virtues, may not be the proper approach
for resolving delicate academic freedom concerns that may disrupt the
important work performed by scholars and academics in American higher education. Thus, reconsideration of the analytical framework used to
assess academic freedom and the First Amendment protection accorded
academic speech is required.
III. WHAT IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?
A. The Meaning and Protections of Academic Freedom
The meaning of academic freedom and the scope of any safeguards
that flow from such freedom are the source of considerable debate.55
Courts have observed that the term academic freedom is “often used, but
little explained,”56 and also have indicated that “[w]hile the exact parameters of the freedom are less than clear, it is evident that the freedom is
intended only to prevent government action that ‘cast[s] a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”57 Academic freedom is highly acclaimed in
American higher education by academic faculty, students, and the educational institution itself as the freedom to engage in intellectual expression
without censorship or fear of adverse retaliatory action.58 Since the
1950s, courts have acknowledged that colleges and universities play a
vital role in the development of our nation’s citizenry and rely on academic freedom to create and maintain an environment conducive for intellectual discourse and learning.
From an institutional perspective, the meaning of academic freedom was perhaps best captured in the often-cited language from Justice

54. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
55. See Academic Freedom Is a Touchstone of a Democratic Society, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 8,
2011; Robert Akerman, Academic Freedom Isn’t Necessarily a Federal Case, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
Sept. 9, 1991.
56. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000).
57. Heublein v. Wefald, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1199 (D. Kan. 2011) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
58. ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 2–3 (2010).
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Frankfurter’s 1957 concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.59 In this
landmark Supreme Court decision, which tested whether faculty academic speech was entitled to constitutional protection, Frankfurter declared
that the “business of a university” depends on essential freedoms to foster an atmosphere for learning: “It is an atmosphere in which there prevail ‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university—to determine for itself
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”60
Thus, the impact of academic freedom permits colleges and universities to develop degree programs; retain faculty and staff; recruit and
admit students; and distinguish their academic mission in the higher education community without compromise.
In a 1923 lecture, Harvard University professor Charles Homer
Haskins described academic freedom as a professor’s intellectual liberty—the right to teach truth as he or she sees it.61 In concert with academic-freedom protections that extend to the institution, academic freedom
grants faculty substantial discretion regarding scholarship and teaching
without the threat of reprisals or disciplinary action to influence their
academic work. For professors and scholars, academic freedom allows
autonomy regarding the selection of classroom content and determining
how academic work shall be performed.62 As the activities performed by
faculty expand beyond teaching and scholarly research, it is unclear
whether academic freedom will protect all manner of faculty speech.63
In resolving this uncertainty, academic freedom should not be understood as an isolated concept or self-serving proposition that protects
the interest of academics without respect to the entire university community. For individual faculty, academic freedom must be viewed within the
institution’s organizational and operational framework. Colleges and
universities are comprised of students, faculty, support staff, and administrators with stakeholders that include parents, elected officials, trustees,
taxpayers, and private donors. In this context, faculty play a vital role in
the institution, but academic freedom does not provide faculty with an
unqualified license to free expression. Instead, academic freedom exists
59. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 257 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 263.
61. See CHARLES HOMER HASKINS, THE RISE OF UNIVERSITIES (1957).
62. See Frederick Schauer, Is There a Right to Academic Freedom?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 907
(2006). Schauer’s discussion on individual academic freedom points out the difficulty in asserting
that academic freedom exists as a right but also observes the evidence of academic freedom in our
jurisprudence. See id.
63. Gary A. Olson, The Limits of Academic Freedom, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 9,
2009), http://chronicle.com/article/The-Limits-of-Academic-Freedom/49354.
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to facilitate the scholarly and teaching functions performed by faculty
and to allow faculty to express themselves freely on academic matters
that are a central component of the college or university mission. Thus,
for purposes of this article, academic freedom pertains to potential content-based restrictions on research, writing, and the viewpoints expressed
in the classroom.
Besides the protections academic freedom provides faculty, it also
distinguishes the faculty from administrators and support-staff members
of the university community who do not enjoy academic freedom. Routinely, non-faculty personnel have an at-will relationship with the institution and may be dismissed without recourse. Less settled or obvious is
whether faculty members who occupy administrative positions, in addition to a faculty appointment, remain entitled to academic-freedom protection and, if so, to what degree. Academics engaged in administrative
work, depending on the nature and content of the work, may be entitled
to academic-freedom protection. For example, faculty serving on a promotion and tenure decision-making committee may engage in legitimate
academic speech that deserves academic-freedom protection. On the other hand, faculty engaged in administrative work on topics such as strategic planning, editorial boards, or fundraising and alumni affairs might be
outside the scope of academic-freedom protection. In either case, academic-freedom protection hinges on the connection academic speech has
to a particular scholarly or teaching concern.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished courts to respect the
academic judgment of university faculty and avoid second-guessing the
professional judgment of faculty on academic matters.64 Hence, the voice
of the faculty has an important role in managing the academic affairs of
the institution due to the unique skills they bring to the higher education
enterprise. But, where faculty speech uttered while performing administrative duties does not entail a scholarly or academic context, academicfreedom protection would be misplaced.
Likewise, faculty “speech” that constitutes disruptive behavior, unduly interferes with the institution’s operations, creates a hostile environment, or includes profanity, threats, or racial or gender slurs might
easily be deemed unworthy of academic-freedom protection. Where such

64. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1985); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000)
(arguing that academic freedom rests with the university, not the faculty).
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speech has no value from a scholarly or pedagogical perspective, academic freedom is improper.65
Also, it is worth noting that students enjoy a measure of academic
freedom as well. For instance, among German universities, Lehrfreiheit
acknowledges the right of students to attend any lecture and the absence
of required courses.66 Students have the freedom to study and learn free
from harassment or unlawful discrimination but at all times, a student’s
scholarly status is subject to the faculty. Indeed, for the individual faculty, including full-time faculty, adjunct professors, lecturers, and research
fellows, academic freedom provides substantial protections that center on
their roles as teachers and scholars.
B. Academic Freedom As a Professional Construct
While academic freedom as a legal concept has garnered significant
attention in the wake of Garcetti because of concern that the decision
could lead lower courts to construe academic freedom in an increasingly
limited manner, it is important to appreciate that academic freedom has
been characterized and defined as a professional concept as well.67 The
formation and work of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) ushered into American higher education a dynamic definition of academic freedom. The AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles
on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure and the 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom represented the earliest efforts to set
out academic freedom as a focal point of American higher education and
65. See Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (dealing with professor disciplined
for vulgar and profane classroom speech that was not germane to the course subject matter).
66. See Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (1988).
67. See WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING 615 (4th
ed. 2007); see also Colleen M. Galambos, Academic Freedom: A Right Worth Protecting, J. SOC.
WORK EDUC. (Jan. 1, 2010); Robert M. O’Neil et al., Protecting an Independent Faculty Voice:
Academic Freedom After Garcetti v. Ceballos, ACADEME (Nov. 1, 2009); Encarnacion Pyle, Christian Librarian Loses Suit vs. OSU, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, (June 9, 2010); Katherine Wolfe, U
Pushes to Protect Faculty Freedom of Speech, U-WIRE (Apr. 2, 2009). American colleges and universities were introduced to academic freedom as a professional concept as a result of the exposure
many Americans received while earning graduate and doctoral degrees at universities in England,
France, and Germany during the nineteenth century. In particular, German universities recognized
academic freedom as Lehrfreiheit—the right of faculty to teach on any subject, and other concepts
such as Freiheit der Wissenschaf—freedom of scientific research. According to noted historian
Professor Walter P. Metzger, “[b]etween 1870 and 1900, some eight thousand American college
graduates had flocked to German universities for advanced instruction in a variety of disciplines, and
many had returned convinced that the Germans’ concept of academic freedom held the key to their
cynosure achievements and should be transplanted onto American soil.” Metzger, supra note 66, at
1267–72.
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the academic profession.68 The 1915 Declaration identifies three elements of academic freedom: “[F]reedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action.”69
The joint 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and
Tenure issued by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges
and Universities sought to define the role of faculty in American higher
education beyond the typical master-servant relationship, recognizing
academic freedom as essential for scholars to pursue truth and serve society.70 Moreover, the 1940 Statement indicated that college and university teachers remain free to speak and write as private citizens, but as
scholars they should remain aware that their utterances may be judged by
the public.71 “Hence, [faculty] should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for opinions of others,
and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for
the institution.”72
Subsequently, the AAUP attempted to refine its position as to extramural speech in the 1964 Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances. In pertinent part, this 1964 statement provides:
The controlling principle is that a faculty member’s expression of
opinion as a citizen cannot constitute grounds for dismissal unless it
clearly demonstrates the faculty member’s unfitness for his or her
position. Extramural utterances rarely bear upon faculty member’s
fitness for the position. Moreover, a final decision should take into
account the faculty member’s entire record as teacher and scholar.73

While the AAUP and its collaborative work with the Association of
American Colleges and Universities represent the collective voices of
faculty members at the nation’s premiere institutions of higher education,
the pressing questions raised by these efforts throughout the twentieth
century appear to be two-fold: “uncertainty as to what academic freedom
68. See Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J.C. & U.L. 791
(2010).
69. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 393 (1915).
70. JOAN DELFATTORE, KNOWLEDGE IN THE MAKING: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND FREE
SPEECH IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES 219 (2010).
71. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 Statement].
72. Id.
73. See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Committee A Statement on Extramural Utterances, 51
AAUP BULL. 29 (1965), reprinted in AAUP Policy Documents and Reports (1968), available at
http://www.aaup.org/report/committee-statement-extramural-utterances.
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is” and “if faculty do not know what academic freedom is, who does?”74
The AAUP has remained an important defender of academic freedom
rights for faculty, and courts have relied on the policy statements issued
by the AAUP in numerous judicial opinions. For almost 100 years, the
AAUP has stood as an important voice in the higher education community, advocating a broad interpretation of academic freedom. But there is
evidence that the AAUP has had its share of failures, as observed by Ellen W. Schrecker.75 Her writing regarding academic freedom during the
McCarthyism era indicated a troubling willingness at local AAUP chapters to avoid academic freedom cases involving individual faculty members. Schrecker addressed the AAUP’s practice during this period:
It was the Association’s standard policy that once a complaint had
been received, jurisdiction over the case would immediately shift to
Committee A and the national office. The wisdom of such a policy
was obvious: local people were often too close to the individuals involved to preserve the detachment necessary for an impartial investigation. In addition, as was demonstrated at many schools where
violations of academic freedom occurred, the members of the
AAUP were reluctant to confront their administration.76

While the AAUP remains a leading voice given the wide array of
stakeholders that colleges and universities must account for, including
the government and the private sector, the importance of academic freedom is a priority for an increased number of academic groups such as the
Society for American Law Teachers (SALT), the American Association
for Law Schools (AALS), the American Library Association (ALA), the
American Sociological Association (ASA), and various other organizations. In sum, the meaning of academic freedom may remain difficult to
define, but the AAUP stands as one of many advocates for academic
speech protections going forward.
C. Reflective Academic Freedom Legal Precedent
Perhaps the darkest period in American history for faculty members, academics, and scholars at colleges and universities was the
McCarthy era.77 During the 1950s, the U.S. political landscape was con74. ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 13
(1986) (discussing the 1953 debate among academics at Wesleyan University in Middleton, Connecticut on academic freedom and responding to the U.S. Congressional House Un-American Activities Committee).
75. Id. at 318.
76. Id.
77. See generally SCHRECKER, supra note 74.
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sumed with the prosecution of those engaged in “un-American activities.”78 Known as McCarthyism in recognition of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s vehement opposition to communism, state and federal officials led
the nation’s charge against ideological and practical threats to democracy
and national security. Among those caught up in the whirlwind of suspicion of un-American, unpatriotic behaviors were higher education faculty members.79 For scholars and professors at American colleges and universities, the legal meaning of academic freedom would be seriously examined as a constitutional matter for the first time. Moreover, the legal
question as to whether the First Amendment sustained academic freedom
as a constitutional protection would remain a perplexing constitutional
question for years to come.80
The challenge of understanding a contemporary judicial meaning of
academic freedom requires appreciation of the treatment courts have historically extended this seemingly murky subject. For instance in 1951, a
University of New Hampshire faculty member was subject to a state attorney general investigation intended to determine whether his class lectures and activities violated the New Hampshire Subversive Activities
Act in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.81 The New Hampshire law declared
subversive organizations unlawful, and persons in subversive activities
(i.e., subversive persons) were disqualified from employment at public
educational institutions.82 In Sweezy, the petitioner-faculty member appeared in two hearings as part of the attorney general’s investigation to
identify subversive persons within state government.83 At both hearings,
the faculty member declined to answer questions about his alleged contact and involvement with the Communist Party or any program that
might seek the overthrow of the government.84 In particular, the faculty
member refused to answer questions about the Progressive Party or the
Progressive Party of America and its members, and refused to answer
questions regarding a lecture given to students in a humanities course.85
78. Id. at 3.
79. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99
YALE L.J. 251, 294 (1989) (examining the First Amendment’s impact on the concept of academic
freedom).
80. Constitutional principles of academic freedom were developed in two periods. The 1950s
and 1960s involved cases on faculty and institutional freedom interference from external governmental bodies. By contrast, the 1970s and 1980s focused on faculty freedom from institutional intrusion. See KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 67, at 615.
81. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 239, 243.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 244.

2013] Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti

15

The attorney general’s questions were intended to determine whether the
faculty member was indeed a subversive person as defined by New
Hampshire law.86 Sweezy refused to answer the questions propounded by
the attorney general because the questions were not pertinent to the matter under inquiry, and the questions infringed upon an area protected under the First Amendment.87 Subsequently, the faculty member was
brought before the New Hampshire Superior Court to answer these questions; he again refused and was held in contempt.88 The New Hampshire
Supreme Court affirmed that decision.89 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the lower court, finding that Sweezy was denied due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.90
The Court found that the faculty member’s rights to lecture and associate with others were constitutionally protected freedoms that had
been abridged by the attorney general’s investigation.91 “We believe that
there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s liberties in the areas
of academic freedom and political expression . . . .”92 Further, the Court
characterized the necessity for academic freedom at American universities as “self-evident” based upon the “vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth.”93 It is worth noting that
the Court’s focus here is fixed not on the generalized entity that is the
college, university, or institution, but rather on “those who guide.”94
Holding that the Bill of Rights acts as a safeguard that bars invasion of
the petitioner’s academic liberties, the Court declined to place what it
referred to as a straitjacket on intellectual leaders at American colleges
and universities.95 To do so, the Court appeared to surmise, would have
tremendous consequences: “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”96
Expanding on the majority’s holding, Justice Frankfurter offered a
concurring opinion that characterized the scope of academic freedom and

86. Id. at 246.
87. Id. at 244.
88. Id. at 244–45.
89. Id. at 245.
90. Id. at 254–55.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 250.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
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its importance to democracy.97 Acknowledging that the petitioner/faculty
member had a constitutionally guaranteed right to lecture, Frankfurter
indicated that New Hampshire’s justification for the intrusion was grossly inadequate.98 In particular, the state’s reliance on evidence that the
petitioner was a Socialist affiliated with anti-American groups and coeditor of an article sympathetic to non-capitalist countries failed to justify
the government’s intrusion on the petitioner’s intellectual freedoms.99
Further, the concurring opinion made clear that there was a compelling
reason to reverse the judgment of the New Hampshire courts because the
intrusion made by the state’s attorney general represented the kind of evil
that may erode the spirit of free inquiry that is necessary to sustain a university.100
Relying on arguments advanced by academic leaders from Johns
Hopkins University and Harvard University, Frankfurter compares
thoughts and actions that are academic and political, and deems both presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.101 Also, finding that university activities regarding the pursuit of knowledge must be
left as unfettered as possible, the concurrence stated: “Political power
must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the
interest of wise government and the people’s well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling.”102 Hence, although the
Court’s decision denounced intrusions not by university administrators,
but off-campus governmental officials, the Court’s decision affirmed the
nation as a progressive society and academic freedom as a presumptive
shield against government intrusion. The decision took great care to
point out the importance of democracy and teaching to the development
of youth, and the harm that may result from an invasion of academic
freedom.
In a similar case, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,103 faculty members at the State University of New York, formerly the University of
Buffalo, argued that a condition of their employment contracts allowing
removal for seditious statements or acts was unconstitutionally vague. 104
97. Id. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 261 (emphasis added).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 262.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
104. Id. at 596–98 (the conditions emerged from the Feinberg Law, which was intended to
enforce provisions of certain New York statutes (§§3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105
of the Civil Service Law), that found dismissal proper for treasonable or seditious utterances, or
advocating the overthrow of government by force, violence, or any unlawful means).
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The faculty members (appellants) had refused to sign a certificate disavowing Communist ties before the State University implemented new
provisions in their employment contracts.105 The new contract provisions,
statute §§ 3021 and 3022 of the Education Law and § 105 of the Civil
Service Law, would presumptively disqualify one from public sector
employment as a university professor for mere membership in or association with a group defined as a subversive organization.106 Further, disqualification could not be rebutted by showing non-active membership or
the absence of intent to pursue unlawful aims.107
The Court explained that language stating that “seditious” or “treasonable” acts pose certain danger to First Amendment freedoms was left
ill-defined.108 The New York law relied upon for purposes of the university’s plan applied virtually no limits to what might be meant as seditious
utterances or acts.109 In support of the appellants’ view—that the university plan designed to prevent hiring and retention of persons committed
to subversive behavior was unconstitutionally vague—the Court observed that where academic freedom may be stifled, precision in communicating that expression or speech that is not protected is necessary.110
Faculty can and ought to police their classroom speech as well as ideas
and views they express in the larger marketplace.111 For the individual
faculty member, this may create a challenge if objectionable utterance
and expression are defined by abstractions.112 In this case, the Court
found that the State University of New York had a legitimate interest—
protecting the educational system from subversion—but that the approach utilized was unconstitutionally vague.113
The very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of
its proscriptions make it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism.
It would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as possible
from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in this intricate machinery . . . . The result must be to

105. Id. at 592.
106. See id. at 594.
107. Id. at 608 (noting that disqualification could only be rebutted by denying membership,
denying that the organization advocated overthrow of the government by force, or denying that the
teacher had knowledge positions advocated by the group).
108. See id. at 598–99.
109. Id. at 599.
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 601 (citation omitted).
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stifle ‘that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially
to cultivate and practice . . . .’114

Put another way, the Court found that the university’s approach to
eradicating subversion could be viewed as having a chilling effect that
stifled the “free play of spirit” and fundamental personal liberties upon
which academic freedom depends.115 Moreover, the Court was compelled
to strike down the State University of New York program as unconstitutionally vague for practical reasons as well:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of
the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom.116

The individual faculty member serves as a resource for the academic process. However, academic employment should not be contingent on
the forfeiture of constitutional liberties. Acceptance of such tenets would
undermine the mission of American higher education and place an intellectual ban on the development of our country’s leadership. Our jurisprudence has rejected such an approach and protects the liberty rights of
faculty in the interests of freedom, democracy, and preparation of the
future citizenry.117
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Sweezy and Keyishian support the freedom of individual faculty members to pursue associations or
activities guided by their intellectual interests. These decisions
acknowledge the importance that the individual faculty member maintain
the freedom to pursue intellectual matters at his or her discretion without
fear of reprisal and the harm that might result from stifling free expression. Subsequent decisions have also embraced the viewpoint that faculty
should be extended significant discretion.118 Moreover, our jurisprudence
does not dismiss the place of the educational institution. “Academic
freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of
114. Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183, 195 (1952)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
117. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326
U.S. 1 (1945) (the Nation’s future depends on training future leaders); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (freedom at American universities require that teachers and students remain free to inquire, study, evaluate, and gain new understanding, or our civilization will die).
118. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that faculty members must have wide discretion to make judgment about academic performance).
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ideas among teachers and students . . . but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decision making by the academy itself.”119
In NLRB v. Yeshiva,120 the Court addressed whether full-time faculty functioned as supervisory and managerial employees entitled to collectively bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).121 The
National Labor Relations Board (Board) granted the Yeshiva University
Faculty Association (Union) petition for certification allowing the Union
to organize as a collective bargaining unit.122 The university, however,
refused to bargain with the Union, arguing that the faculty members were
managerial employees and thus excluded from the benefits of the
NLRA.123 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the
university, denying the petition, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.124
In discussing the scope of the faculty’s role in the modern university, the
Supreme Court recognized that the question of whether faculty employees were managerial personnel was dependent on how a faculty is structured and operates.125 Also, the Court’s decision was influenced by the
belief that notions of shared authority and collegiality often involve faculty participation in academic and non-academic matters such as personnel decisions, student affairs, and campus facilities.126 Are faculty members entitled to academic freedom regarding non-academic tasks performed in the course of their academic employment? Obviously, the
scope of protections provided by academic freedom may be viewed as
identifying those professorial functions that are highly valued versus
those activities that are not. For this reason, academic freedom is and has
remained a treasured asset for college and university professors.
1. Balancing Faculty and Institutional Interests
Whether the Garcetti holding undermines academic freedom for
faculty speech regarding teaching, research, or related service activities
is the critical question going forward. A general decision that First
Amendment protection does not extend to the speech of public-sector
119. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (holding that student’s dismissal from combined undergraduate medical education program was not arbitrary and
capricious because university engaged in conscientious and careful deliberations despite his assumed
property interest in the program) (citation omitted).
120. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 679.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 680.
126. Id. at 677.
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employees offered in performance of their official job duties would strike
a tremendous blow to professorial expression at public colleges and universities. Without more guidance from the Supreme Court, Garcetti’s
impact on academic speech may be difficult to determine.
Garcetti arguably impacts academic freedom from three plausible
perspectives. First, Garcetti could be viewed as categorically underestimating the corrosive effect the “official duties” test might have on
academic-freedom protections because a faculty member’s official duties
include core speech activity, such as scholarship and teaching. Second,
Garcetti could be seen as the Court’s continuing effort to elevate the
public employer’s interest in workplace efficiency while being almost
dismissive of academic speech and its complexities. In either case, understanding academic or professorial speech is essential to distinguishing
the work performed by college professors from that of other public sector
employees. Finally, Garcetti may usher in an era that may advance academic freedom for core academic functions while assessing the scope of
academic-freedom protection provided to faculty performing administrative work as part of their official duties on a case-by-case basis.
The official duties of a public university professor or academic are
distinguishable from those performed by other public-sector employees.
While sharing expertise and counseling others may represent the fullrange of job responsibilities performed by some public-sector employees,
this is just the beginning for a faculty member in American higher education. The college professor’s job duties are varied and often defy a simple explanation. The day-to-day tasks and responsibilities of a professor
might routinely include classroom teaching, advising students and colleagues, scholarly research, preparing manuscripts for publication, symposia participation, committee service, faculty governance, public speaking, media communications, as well as the numerous foundational activities that underlie these tasks. The varied nature of the activities on this
list hint at the complexity involved in actually determining a faculty
member’s “official job duties.” As Justice Kennedy indicated in the Garcetti majority opinion, however, the proper method of determining an
employee’s job duties relies on a practical inquiry.127 But that inquiry can
be complex for academics due to the nature of academic speech. Recently, scholars have discussed the broad reach of professorial free speech
rights:
The right to speak freely on matters of public concern most obviously covers the extramural speech of professors when, for exam127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006).

2013] Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech: Post-Garcetti

21

ple, they publish in newspapers, appear on television or write blogs
to comment on matters of current political debate. But it may also
cover intramural speech, commenting on the administration of their
universities or criticizing [sic] the poor running of a department or
research centre [sic].128

Others have agreed that defining duties inherent in a faculty job is
not a simple matter. “When it comes, for example, to ‘official duties,’ the
clarity with which a court can determine the responsibilities of an assistant district attorney . . . simply does not apply to college professors.”129
For public employees, including faculty and professors at public
universities, the First Amendment does protect their right to speak on
matters of public concern. This protection, however, does not extend to
matters that are purely internal or disruptive to the operation of the organization. Pickering130 and Connick131 both deal with the question of
whether the speech of public employees is entitled to constitutional protection. In Pickering, a public high school teacher was discharged for
sending a letter to a local newspaper that criticized efforts by the school
board and superintendent to raise new revenue for the schools.132 The
teacher’s speech was found to be detrimental to the efficient operation of
the school district.133 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, observed
that the teacher’s speech involved a matter of public concern and as such,
“statements by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact that the statements
are directed at their nominal superiors.”134 Here, the teacher’s right to
freely voice his concerns on matters of public importance was not outweighed by the employer’s efficiency interests relative to the management of its workforce.
In Connick, Shelia Myers, an assistant district attorney in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, was notified that she would be
transferred to a different section of the criminal court to perform her duties as a prosecutor.135 Myers opposed the transfer and shared her concerns with her superiors.136 Although urged to accept the transfer, Myers
128. BARENDT, supra note 58, at 188.
129. Robert M. O’Neil, Academic Speech in the Post-Garcetti Environment, 7 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 1, 18 (2008).
130. See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
131. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
132. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 574.
135. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148.
136. Id.
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took matters into her own hands by preparing and circulating a questionnaire among her co-workers regarding the office transfer policy, office
morale, the need for a grievance committee, and whether employees felt
pressured to work on political campaigns.137 Once Myers distributed the
questionnaires, she was credited with creating a “mini-insurrection”
within the office, which led to the decision to terminate her employment
for refusing to accept the transfer.138
Myers filed suit in federal court alleging that she was wrongfully
terminated in violation of her constitutional right to free speech.139 The
district court agreed, finding that the questionnaire, not her refusal to accept the transfer, was the true reason for her termination.140 Moreover,
the district court found that the questionnaire dealt with a matter of public concern and that the district attorney, herein the public employer, had
failed to demonstrate that Myers’s speech interfered with the operations
of the district attorney’s office.141 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the decision.142
The Supreme Court accepted this matter for review, noting that
“[f]or most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public
employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of
employment—including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.”143 The Court further indicated that after a series of disputes
during the 1950s and thereafter, the primary issue became whether public-employee speech could be suppressed by threat of employment termination when the employees joined political associations that public
officials deemed subversive.144 Finding that the First Amendment was
designed to assure free expression and the unfettered interchange of ideas, Connick followed Pickering’s rationale that the First Amendment
protects public-employee speech on matters of legitimate concern.145
On this basis, the Supreme Court found that Myers’s speech involved only a matter of personal interest, rather than public concern, and
was not entitled to First Amendment protection:
When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,
137. Id. at 146.
138. Id. at 141.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 142.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 143.
144. Id. at 144.
145. Id. at 145.
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government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of
the First Amendment.146

The Court also determined that the question of whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern turns on “the content,
form, and context of [the] given statement . . . .”147 In sum, the Connick
Court gave significant attention to the employer’s interest in the effective
and efficient operation of its public office and to the argument that “the
First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.”148 Myers’s questionnaire was characterized as an employee grievance regarding internal office policy and therefore undeserving of First Amendment
protection.
Under Pickering, and confirmed in Connick, the Court embraced a
multi-part analysis for public-employee free speech challenges that could
apply to college and university faculty members.149 First, the employee’s
speech must address a “matter of public concern.”150 Next, the employee’s interest in free expression must be balanced against the public employer’s interest in efficient operation of the workplace.151 Finally, the
employee must show that her protected speech was a motivating factor
that led to the disciplinary action. Likewise, if the public employer can
show that the disciplinary action would have been imposed regardless of
the employee’s protected speech, no First Amendment protections should
be extended.152 Though the analytical approach applied in Pickering and
Connick provided no bright-line rule regarding the scope of free-speech
protection that may be available to any public employee, the Supreme
Court’s guidance effectively offered an avenue to accommodate the
complexity of free-speech disputes in higher education. It directed lower
courts and college and university decision makers to weigh the interests
of the parties rather than rely exclusively on content-based and rolebased analyses.

146. Id. at 146.
147. Id. at 147–48.
148. Id. at 149.
149. See Seog Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in
the School Setting, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 413 (2002).
150. Id. at 415.
151. See id. at 417.
152. See Kevin L. Cope, Defending the Ivory Tower: A Twenty-First Century Approach to the
Pickering-Connick Doctrine and Public Higher Education Faculty After Garcetti, 33 J.C. & U.L.
313 (2007).
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The concerns examined in Connick, with regard to the operational
and efficiency interests of the public-sector employer, again were addressed by the Court in Waters v. Churchill.153 Waters involved the termination of a nurse at a public hospital after she made personal and disruptive remarks.154 The nurse argued that her comments, indicating that
nurses worked in certain areas without proper training, only criticized the
hospital’s cross-training policy.155 But her supervisor believed that her
comments promoted a negative atmosphere, reflected poorly on the hospital, and could not be tolerated.156 In the plurality opinion issued by the
Court, Justice O’Connor, writing for four Justices, relied on the standard
announced in Connick and Pickering as to when public employee’s
speech is protected by the First Amendment:
To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern,
and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on this matter
must not be outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.157

Believing that insufficient weight was given to the public employer’s interest in efficient employment decision making, Justice O’Connor
appeared to support application of the Connick approach where the employer makes a reasonable investigation to determine the content of the
speech before firing an employee.158 In this case, Justice O’Connor observed that the potential disruptive impact of the nurse’s speech threatened to undermine the public employer’s authority.159 Thus, the matter
was vacated and remanded to determine whether the nurse was indeed
terminated for her disruptive, unprotected comments rather than her
statements about cross-training.160
A worthwhile example of the Pickering-Connick approach in the
higher education context is found in the convoluted dispute in Webb v.
Board of Trustees of Ball State University.161 Professor Gary L. Webb, a
tenured faculty member in Ball State’s criminology department, filed a
complaint in federal court alleging, among other things, that changes to
153. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
154. See id. at 661.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 665.
157. Id. at 668 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 676.
159. Id. at 681.
160. Justice Scalia, writing for three Justices, concurred in the judgment but declined to require
any constitutional investigation terminating an employee. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. 167 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (7th Cir. 1999).
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his teaching schedule and the decision to replace him as chairperson for
the criminology department were implemented by the university in retaliation for Webb’s protected speech.162 In 1994, Webb complained that
another faculty member sexually harassed a student, alleged that administrators were guilty of “ethical lapses,” and made various accusations of
misconduct against other members of the department.163 Professor Webb
argued that his sexual harassment complaint and the related complaints
that he later presented in a 225-page document were protected speech,
which prompted him to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and, thereafter, seek a preliminary injunction directing the university to stop any retaliatory action.164
Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
affirmed the decision denying the preliminary injunction, finding an absence of irreparable harm, and acknowledging the potential disruptive
effects to the faculty at large caused by an injunction requiring the university to implement changes to its teaching schedule.165 Moreover, relying on the Pickering-Connick analysis, Judge Easterbrook was not persuaded that Professor Webb’s speech represented a matter of public concern under the Pickering analysis or that changing his teaching schedule
violated his constitutional right to free expression.166 Although Judge
Easterbrook maintained that the university’s decision to change Professor
Webb’s teaching schedule and to replace him as chair of the criminology
department, viewed in the context of the numerous administrative disputes, could be deemed as retaliatory action, the court chose to balance
the university’s right to set curriculum and a faculty member’s right to
free expression—in effect, seeking to balance academic freedom interests held by the faculty and institution.167
In sum, the court resolved that Professor Webb’s contentions embodied nothing more than a mangled dispute between faculty and administrators at the university. According to the court, a university’s “ability
to set a curriculum is as much an element of academic freedom as any
scholar’s right to express a point of view.”168 Where the core functions of
teaching and scholarship are at issue, the court stated the following:

162. Id. at 1148.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1149.
166. Id. at 1150.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1149.
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Universities are entitled to insist that members of the faculty (and
their administrative aides) devote their energies to promoting the
goals such as research and teaching. When the bulk of a professor’s
time goes over to fraternal warfare, students and the scholarly
community alike suffer, and the university may intervene to restore
decorum and ease tensions. 169

While not denouncing individual academic freedom, the court expressed an unwillingness to intervene or set out when courts might interfere with a university’s curriculum planning or staffing decisions.170 The
Seventh Circuit framed academic freedom in the context of research and
teaching but with limits that recognized the institution’s voice apart from
that of the individual faculty member.
Furthermore, the court’s exercise of restraint in Webb, with respect
to faculty demands that their views be given unlimited protection, is consistent with prior rulings. Academic freedom is neither a license for unlimited expression nor a basis to permit dysfunctional operations within
the institution.171 While academic freedom is not a right enumerated in
the Constitution, it is safeguarded by the First Amendment to preserve
the exchange of intellectual ideas at colleges and universities.172 The
Pickering and Connick decisions, while not higher education cases per
se, have been applied to resolve academic speech disputes where First
Amendment academic-freedom protections are concerned.173 Garcetti
imposes new analytical concerns regarding academic speech and constitutional protections.
Public employees do not abandon their First Amendment right to
free speech upon entering the government-sponsored workplace; they
retain the right to speak out publicly as citizens on matters of public concern—not purely internal matters or matters intended to disrupt workplace operations. Despite these safeguards, Garcetti’s “official duties”
test triggers important questions regarding what constitutional protections are available for statements uttered by professors at public universities in the course of performing their official job duties.174
Under Garcetti, legitimate academic speech on controversial subject matter may not have an adequate umbrella of protection. College and
university professors do not exclusively speak out as citizens on matters
169. Id. at 1150.
170. Id.
171. See Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that academic freedom
did not grant a professor the uncontrolled right to expression with established curricular content).
172. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
173. See Fong v. Purdue Univ., 692 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
174. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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of public concern. At public colleges and universities, academics speaking and writing as teachers, scholars, researchers, committee members,
or public servants on matters within the scope of their professorial duties
may or may not address matters of public concern. This does not suggest
that faculty should be granted an absolute right to free expression under
the guise of academic freedom. But the law should permit a balance to be
struck between professorial free speech interests and institutional interests regarding workforce control. For instance, with regard to classroom
speech, Professor Michael Olivas has observed the following:
[E]xpression of controversial ideas and criticism of the status quo
must be protected, even at the risk of discomfort for the teacher or
class, when a professor is teaching within her field. . . . But academics still must adhere to professional standards in voicing their views.
This “professorial function” approach protects classroom utterances
so long as they meet professional standards and result from training,
developed expertise, and scrupulous care in presenting material. . . .
Faculty should be entitled to special consideration only in pursuing
academic endeavors (hence “academic” freedom), such as in the
classroom. Extending the protections of academic freedom to extraacademic speech, in this light, is unprincipled.175

Moreover, curtailing professorial speech that cannot survive a germaneness inquiry—a test that determines whether an individual’s academic speech is sufficiently close to the university’s academic mission—
may also serve as a justifiable control on academic freedom.176
However, applying Garcetti’s “official duties” analysis to academic
speech, whether uttered inside or outside the classroom, may lead to a
determination that such speech offered in the course of performing one’s
official job duties is not protected speech. Because professors at public
colleges and universities may engage in intramural and extramural
speech within the scope of their employment, Garcetti may go too far.
Pursuant to Pickering and Connick, the First Amendment appears to protect professorial expression on matters of public concern. “Academics’
extramural expression is protected by the First Amendment, unless a
university can show that it has the potential seriously to disrupt working
relations on campus and that this risk outweighs the value of the

175. Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on Professorial Academic Freedom: Second Thoughts on
the Third “Essential Freedom,” 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1844, 1845 (1993).
176. See Alan K. Chen, Bureaucracy and Distrust: Germaneness and the Paradoxes of the
Academic Freedom Doctrine, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 955 (2006); see also KAPLIN & LEE, supra note
67, at 648–52 (discussing other methods to ferret out the viability of academic freedom claims).
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speech.”177 Further Supreme Court guidance is necessary because public
college or university professors do not exclusively speak out as “citizens” within the Pickering or Garcetti sense, but as academics and experts. Faculty should be free to comment on an array of matters important to society without looking over their collective shoulders to see
whether they are being monitored.178 Garcetti, therefore, has opened the
door to a renewed conversation about academic freedom. Do the prevailing arguments set out in Pickering, Connick, Waters, and now Garcetti
mark only support for the public employer’s efficiency interests at the
expense of individual academic freedom? Or, does Garcetti represent
confirmation that the First Amendment secures the core academic freedoms for teaching and scholarship, but that academic speech without an
academic foundation and critical of administrative matters is not constitutionally protected? The post-Garcetti case law provides helpful insight.
2. Contemplating the Post-Garcetti Case Law
The Garcetti decision has led lower courts to carefully construe the
work performed by individual faculty and its connection to core academic functions at public colleges and universities. In assessing whether a
faculty member’s speech represents official job duties, some courts have
been inclined to set aside academic-freedom protections and uphold disciplinary action by college and university administrators for faculty
speech unrelated to teaching or scholarship. Also, lower courts have recognized Garcetti as an opportunity to take pause before affirming an employer’s disciplinary action. Among these post-Garcetti decisions, Kerr
v. Hurd179 represents a well-reasoned application of the Garcetti holding.
In Kerr, the interplay between the official-duties analysis and academic freedom was examined within the context of statements made during classroom instruction.180 Elton R. Kerr, an assistant professor at the
Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM) filed an action in federal
court alleging, inter alia, a violation of his rights to expression under the
United States and Ohio constitutions.181 Dr. Kerr, a specialist of obstetrics and gynecology, contended that he was subject to discipline for
“teaching certain gynecological surgery techniques, advocation [sic] of
vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian procedures, and lecturing

177. BARENDT, supra note 58, at 292.
178. See JOHN S. BRUBACHER, ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIGHER EDUCATION 43 (1982).
179. 694 F. Supp. 2d 817 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
180. See id.
181. Id. at 827–28.
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WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps.”182 Dr.
William W. Hurd, the chair for the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at WS-SOM and a named defendant in the action, argued that Dr.
Kerr’s speech on the use of forceps and vaginal delivery was within his
role as an employee and not entitled to First Amendment protection.183
In applying the precedent set by the Garcetti decision, the court indicated that the Supreme Court’s holding represented a refinement of its
“Connick jurisprudence” requiring a role-based analysis and contentbased analysis.184 The court found that Dr. Kerr’s speech advocating vaginal deliveries was within his role as a teacher of obstetrics; however,
rather than applying the official-duty analysis and declaring Dr. Kerr’s
speech unprotected, the district court observed that the Supreme Court
left undecided whether the official-duty analysis would apply in an academic setting.185 More specifically, the court declined to apply the official-duty analysis and instead applied the “traditional Pickering-Connick
approach” to Dr. Kerr’s in-class speech.186 Furthermore, the court observed that an academic freedom exception was important to protecting
First Amendment values:
Universities should be the active trading floors in the marketplace
of ideas. Public universities should be no different from private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views
are well within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should
certainly receive First Amendment protection, particularly at the
university level. The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from
Stalin’s enforcement of Lysenko biology orthodoxy stands as a
strong counter example to those who would discipline university
professors for not following the “party line.”187

Even if academic freedom was viewed as a narrow exception to
Garcetti, the court found no basis to construe Dr. Kerr’s teaching as a
medical professor as outside the classroom or clinical context. Hence,
speech grounded in a professor’s academic or clinical expertise may be
entitled to constitutional protection. Of course, speech in a clinical con182. Id. at 834.
183. Id. at 843.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of
Educ., No. 3:03cv091, 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir.
2010); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007) (describing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Garcetti as “not clear” regarding cases involving speech related to scholarship or teaching).
187. Kerr, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 844.

30

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 37:1

text may go beyond typical classroom instruction, raising an important
question regarding the fundamental role of the college or university professor and the scope of academic freedom.
Whether Garcetti categorically denies constitutional protection to
academic speech was also at issue in Adams v. Trustees of the University
of North Carolina-Wilmington.188 In this case, a criminology professor,
Michael S. Adams, alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim after
being denied a promotion to full professor.189 Professor Adams joined the
faculty at UNCW in 1993 and was granted tenure in 1998.190 In 2000,
Professor Adams became a Christian; this had a significant influence on
his scholarly writing and service activities, which took a decidedly conservative tone.191 On occasion, the university received complaints from
faculty, staff, and university trustees regarding Professor Adams’s public
expressions.192 In 2004, Professor Adams’s application for promotion to
the rank of full professor was denied for, among other reasons, an insufficient record of tangible academic productivity.193
In response to Professor Adams’s complaint, UNCW filed a motion
for summary judgment that was granted by the district court.194 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit identified several errors in the lower court’s ruling as to the First Amendment claim, all of which demonstrated a misreading of Garcetti.195 While the district court correctly understood that
Garcetti’s analysis focused on the role of the speaker, not the content of
the speech, it held that Professor Adams’s speech—comprised of books
and written commentaries—was not protected by the First Amendment
because it was included in his application for promotion to full professor.196 Finding that “the nature of the employee’s speech at the time it
was made” significant, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred
as a matter of law by concluding that Professor Adams’s speech was
converted to unprotected speech.197
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit observed that the district court ignored the Supreme Court’s language that left uncertain whether Garcetti
188. See Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
189. Id. at 552.
190. Id. at 553.
191. Id.
192. Id. Professor Adams espoused conservative ideological views in columns, books, and
commentaries and became increasingly vocal on political and social issues, offering commentary on
radio and television broadcast prior to applying for promotion to full professor. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 556.
195. Id. at 561.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 562.
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applied in an academic context at a public university.198 According to the
court, “[t]he plain language of Garcetti thus explicitly left open the question of whether its principles apply in the academic genre where issues of
‘scholarship or teaching’ are in play.”199 Also, the court noted that
“[t]here may be instances in which a public university faculty member’s
assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching.”200 In such a situation, Garcetti would appear to apply. But where the speech at issue centered on scholarship and teaching, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court erred in applying Garcetti and identified the Pickering-Connick
standard as the proper analytical approach.201 The court’s reasoning gave
ample consideration to professorial work and the nature of faculty
speech:
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty member under the facts of this case could place beyond the
reach of First Amendment protection many forms of public speech
or service a professor engaged in during his employment. That
would not appear to be what Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent
with our long-standing recognition that no individual loses his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of public employment. In
light of the above factors, we will not apply Garcetti to the circumstances of this case.202

Thereafter, the court determined that Professor Adams’s speech was
that of a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern, but remanded the
case for further proceedings under the Pickering-Connick analytical
framework.203
Despite Garcetti’s holding that public-employee statements made
in the course of official job duties are not constitutionally protected, Kerr
and Adams signify that where academics at public colleges and universities engage in speech involving core academic functions, such expression
may be protected. Regardless of whether the speech involves a faculty
member teaching surgical procedures to medical students, or a professor
writing scholarly articles and books that examine social or political issues, courts appear unwilling to endorse administrative decision-making
198. Id. at 561.
199. Id. at 563.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 564.
203. Id. at 565. The court also referred to this as the McVey test from McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d
271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998), which explained and discussed the elements of the Pickering-Connick
approach.
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that interferes with fundamental academic freedoms regarding teaching
and research.
Although Kerr and Adams extend First Amendment protection to
speech involving core academic functions, the role of a professor routinely involves the opportunity or obligation to comment on managerial
or administrative matters that may involve the allocation of resources,
personnel decisions, or institutional procedures. For example, in Hong v.
Grant,204 a chemical engineering professor at the University of California-Irvine (UC Irvine) filed a complaint in federal court alleging an academic freedom violation regarding critical remarks he made about hiring
and promotion decisions within the department.205 In particular, Professor Hong objected to administrative decisions made in 2003 that led to
the use of lecturers, rather than tenured faculty, to teach undergraduate
courses, and a decision to grant a professor’s application for an accelerated merit salary increase.206 Professor Hong also objected to a 2004 decision to extend an informal offer of employment to another individual.207 Subsequently, Hong applied for a merit salary increase, which was
allegedly denied because his research activities were insufficient.208 This
led to his pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California.209
Professor Hong alleged that he was a victim of illegal retaliation in
response to his vocal criticism of various decisions by university administrators.210 The district court dismissed the complaint finding that
Hong’s statements did not constitute a matter of public concern and were
therefore not protected by the First Amendment.211 Further, the district
court found that Hong’s criticisms were merely internal administrative
comments uttered in the context of Hong’s official duties, consistent with
the reasoning set out in Garcetti.212 This finding compelled the district
court to disagree with Hong’s contention that his statements represented
speech entitled to First Amendment protection.213 To hold otherwise, ac-

204. 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d, 403 F. App’x 236 (9th Cir. 2010).
205. Id. at 1160.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1163.
208. Id. at 1164.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1169.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1170; see also McReady v. O’Malley, 804 F. Supp. 2d 427 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d,
468 F. App’x 391 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 577 (2012) (granting university’s motion
for summary judgment against free speech claims raised by pro se faculty member who expressed
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cording to the district court, would invite expansive constitutionalism
that would perhaps trigger endless judicial supervision for routine university administrative decisions.214
Professor Hong’s argument that his intramural speech criticizing
decisions implemented by administrators at UC Irvine should be granted
First Amendment protection was defeated by the defendant’s summary
judgment motion. The court relied largely on the Garcetti holding but
gave little attention to Justice Kennedy’s cautionary proviso that speech
related to academic matters may be afforded some protection. While Professor Hong’s speech was viewed relative to context, content, and form,
it appears that the undisputed fact that Hong’s statements were made in
the context of his faculty duties triggered no First Amendment protection.
Particularly interesting was the court’s characterization that Professor Hong’s speech represented “internal administrative disputes which
have little or no relevance to the community as a whole.”215 While
Hong’s objections to certain hiring and promotion decisions may not relate to traditional academic duties like teaching or research, his statements concerning the use of lecturers to staff departmental courses could
be construed as an academic matter. “Mr. Hong . . . felt it was the department’s obligation to its students to staff courses with experienced
faculty, rather than younger, transient lecturers.”216 By assessing that
Hong’s speech essentially represented an “internal administrative dispute,” the case contrasts the circumstances at issue in Kerr and Adams,
which protect “core” academic freedom concerns. Hence, faculty speech
performing dual administrative and academic functions arguably will be
subject to more scrutiny to determine whether such speech merits academic-freedom protection post-Garcetti.
Hong’s application of the Garcetti decision appears to indicate that
faculty speech on administrative or quasi-administrative matters shall
neither garner First Amendment protection nor represent an exercise of
academic freedom. But what remains unanswered is what speech or
dissatisfaction with curricular and staffing decisions by university administrators where there was no
evidence that professor spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern).
214. The district court’s decision was appealed and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. Hong v. Grant, 403 F. App’x 236 (9th Cir. 2010). However, it is important to note
that the Ninth Circuit observed the following: “It is far from clearly established today, much less in
2004 when the university officers voted on Hong’s merits increase, that university professors have a
First Amendment right to comment on faculty administrative matters without retaliation.” Id. at 237–
38; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
215. Hong, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
216. Id. at 1163.
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statements uttered by individual faculty members are entitled to First
Amendment protection. Further, how ought higher education administrators and faculty determine whether individual faculty speech uttered in
the course of performing official duties merits employer disciplinary action?
In Renken v. Gregory,217 the Seventh Circuit reviewed a retaliation
complaint raised by Professor Kevin Renken for allegedly engaging in
protected academic speech related to a National Science Foundation
(NSF) grant to support programs at the University of WisconsinMilwaukee, College of Engineering and Applied Sciences.218 After differences arose as to the conditions under which the grant would be administered and how the university would contribute matching funds, the
university decided to return the grant to the NSF.219 Professor Renken
filed a complaint in federal court alleging that the decision to terminate
the grant, inter alia, was a retaliatory act by the university in response to
his extensive criticisms of the university’s proposed use of the grant
funds.220
Professor Renken’s involvement with the NSF grant included the
dual role of principal investigator (PI) and university faculty member. 221
Acknowledging Renken’s numerous complaints about the grant’s administration, the court observed that “Renken was speaking as a faculty employee, and not as a private citizen because administering the grant as a
PI fell within the teaching and service duties that he was employed to
perform.”222 The court found that Professor Renken’s administration of
the NSF grant fell squarely within his teaching duties: “[H]is employment status a[s] full professor depended on the administration of grants,
such as the NSF grant. It was in the course of that administration, that
Renken made his statements about funding improprieties within the confines of the University system and as the principal PI.”223
The court found Renken’s speech undeserving of First Amendment
protection, but simultaneously framed the speech as part of his official
teaching duties.224 With little or no consideration of Justice Kennedy’s
caveat that speech regarding teaching and scholarship might deserve
constitutional protection, the court surmised that Renken’s speech, while
217. 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008).
218. Id. at 770.
219. Id. at 772.
220. Id. at 773.
221. Id. at 771.
222. Id. at 774.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 775.
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part of his teaching duties, was not protected pursuant to Garcetti.225
Moreover, the Renken decision demonstrates the inadequacy of Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion wherein he chose not to address the extent
to which the Garcetti holding supported the protection of speech related
to teaching.226
Likewise, other post-Garcetti decisions have granted public university employers wide latitude to impose disciplinary action in response to
individual faculty speech uttered in the course of performing official duties, especially those duties involving administrative functions. In Gorum
v. Sessoms,227 a 2005 decision by the Delaware State University president
to terminate a faculty member and department chairperson for changing
withdrawals, incompletes, and failing grades without authorization was
challenged on First Amendment grounds.228 President Sessoms found
Professor Gorum’s conduct unprofessional and highly reprehensible.229
Professor Gorum admitted that he made the changes but claimed that he
had sufficient authorization.230 Moreover, Gorum countered that the termination decision was a retaliatory act intended to punish him for acting
as an advisor to a student-athlete charged with violating university policy
barring weapons possession in 2002, and as chairman of a speakers
committee in 2004 for rescinding an invitation to President Sessoms to
speak at a prayer breakfast event.231 The district court granted the university’s motion for summary judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed the
finding that Professor Gorum’s speech was not protected by the First
Amendment.232
The court relied on Garcetti but took some care to explain that the
Supreme Court did not answer whether the “official duty” analysis would
apply in a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.233 As
such, the court acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s caveat in Garcetti that
an argument may be sustained that expressions related to academic
scholarship and classroom instruction may trigger constitutional concerns not addressed by customary employee-speech jurisprudence.234
Because Professor Gorum’s speech was unrelated to scholarship and
225. Id. at 773.
226. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
227. 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009).
228. Id. at 182.
229. Id. at 183.
230. Id. at 182.
231. Id. at 183–84.
232. Id. at 188.
233. Id. at 185–86.
234. Id. at 186 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006)).
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classroom instruction, the court believed it was bound to apply the official duties test, thereby resolving that Professor Gorum’s speech was not
entitled to First Amendment protection.235 Moreover, the court attempted
to clarify when the official duty test should not apply:
Where Garcetti’s official duty test does not apply to a public instructor’s speech “related to scholarship or teaching,” courts apply
the traditional First Amendment protected speech analysis established in [Pickering and Connick] . . . . This is a two-step analysis.
The first considers whether the employee’s speech was on a matter
of public concern. If so, the second requires balancing “between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.”236

It is worth noting that Professor Gorum’s advising activities with
the student-athlete, DaShaun Morris, were found within the scope of his
official duties because it was through his position as a faculty member
and department chair that he was able to advise the student.237 Despite
this finding, Professor Gorum’s speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection.238 This suggests that speech made in the course of advising or mentoring students may not be constitutionally protected as a
function of academic freedom; however, it is plausible that the nature of
the “advising” might dictate a different result. For example, faculty
speaking in an advisory capacity regarding the content of a student essay
would make a stronger case for academic-freedom protection as compared to advising on a student disciplinary matter.239 There may be no
other task performed by a professor or teacher more sensitive than mentoring a student, sometimes through difficult situations. While individual
faculty may rely on academic freedom to protect speech regarding their
scholarly and instructional activities, student mentoring and advising that
lacks an academic foundation is arguably outside the reach of academicfreedom protection.
In another academic affairs decision at the University of Illinois,
College of Medicine at Chicago, the head of the department of surgery
alleged that the university and certain administrators retaliated against
235. Id. at 187.
236. Id. at 186 n.6 (citations omitted).
237. Id. at 186.
238. Id. at 188.
239. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 78 (1985) (discussing the
court’s exercise of the utmost restraint in matters regarding academic standards).
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him in violation of his First Amendment rights.240 Specifically in Abcarian v. McDonald, Dr. Herand Abcarian claimed that the defendants conspired to damage his professional reputation by executing a settlement
agreement regarding a medical malpractice lawsuit filed as a result of a
patient’s death.241 Abcarian believed that because he voiced disagreement with university officials on numerous administrative matters (faculty recruitment, risk management, compensation, etc.), the settlement
agreement was implemented and reported to state and federal authorities
as a retaliatory act to connect Abcarian to the medical malpractice
claim.242 Abcarian brought a lawsuit against the university and various
individual employees, raising several claims including a First Amendment retaliation claim.243 The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding
that Garcetti barred the First Amendment claims because the speech that
triggered the alleged retaliation was made in the course of Abcarian performing his official duties as a public employee.244
Before the Seventh Circuit, Abcarian argued that Garcetti applied
only to bar retaliation claims against employers, not individual coemployees, and that his speech was not offered pursuant to his official
job responsibilities.245 Reading Garcetti broadly, the court rejected this
argument, finding that the decision applied to retaliation claims against
fellow employees.246 Also, the court noted that Garcetti established that
public employees speaking as part of their official duties are speaking as
employees, not citizens, and their speech is not protected regardless of
the content.247 This conclusion may have serious ramifications for any
argument that attempts to limit the import of Garcetti to professors and
academics relative to the content or purpose of academic speech. While
the court resolved that Abcarian was not speaking in a purely academic
sense, the court’s willingness to read Garcetti broadly may impact the
extent to which academic-freedom protection is granted going forward.248
240. Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2010).
241. Id. at 933.
242. Id. at 934.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 935.
245. Id. at 935–36.
246. Id. at 936.
247. Id. at 937.
248. Further, some scholars have argued that the emergence of academic freedom as a constitutional right may not be a sound legal or political position:
It is certainly true that professors have a functional societal role that can be pressed to the
service of justifying protection for academic freedom, including the transmitting of
knowledge to students; developing in students a sense of intellectual curiosity, apprecia-
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Further, the court found unpersuasive Abcarian’s alternative argument that his speech was not made pursuant to his official responsibilities: “When determining whether a plaintiff spoke as an employee or as a
citizen, we take a practical view of the facts alleged in the complaint,
looking to the employee’s level of responsibility and the context in
which the statements were made.”249
Abcarian held a position of significant authority at the University of
Illinois College of Medicine and had a wide range of responsibilities important to the management of the institution. The court cautiously noted
that Abcarian’s speech did not warrant academic-freedom protection because of its administrative nature and resolved that his speech sprang
from his public employment, not his status as citizen.250 Thus, Garcetti
was properly applied and Abcarian’s First Amendment claim dismissed
because the speech at issue—policy-driven and administrative in
origin—was not constitutionally protected.251
tion for the human quest for a life’s meaning, and civic engagement; advancing the frontiers of knowledge and discourse. As a matter of ideal and aspiration, universities and
university professors may think of themselves as pursuing these functions with especially
dedicated intellectual elevation, intellectual honesty, objectivity, and rigor. But as the Supreme Court’s cases persistently insist, there is a difference between the recognition of
these functions as justifications for our societal policies, and the recognition of these
functions as justifications for the creation of a distinct constitutional right. . . . Constitutional doctrines can at times be stultifying, tending to act as both floors and ceilings, diminishing autonomy and diversity. It is not a good idea to try to constitutionalize everything. When constitutional law appropriates too many of our important societal decisions,
the currency of the Constitution as a fundamental law is devalued. When everything is
constitutionalized, nothing is constitutionalized.
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE CONSTITUTION GOES TO COLLEGE: FIVE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS THAT
HAVE SHAPED THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 36–37 (2011).
249. Abcarian, 617 F.3d at 937.
250. Id. at 938. The court recognized that Garcetti includes a possible exemption for speech
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction. Id. at 945 n.5 Whether understood as an
exemption or exception to Garcetti, the Abcarian decision appears to suggest that administrative or
policy expression may not be entitled to academic-freedom protection. This contention is important
for identifying the role the faculty has traditionally had in university governance. See Judith Areen,
Government As Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic Freedom and Governance, 97 GEO. L.J. 945 (2006).
251. See Savage v. Gee, 716 F. Supp. 2d 709 (S.D. Ohio 2010), aff’d, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.
2012), where a librarian at the Ohio State University campus in Mansfield serving on a faculty-staff
committee became involved in a tumultuous debate with faculty members regarding whether certain
books ought to be included on a reading list for incoming freshmen. The librarian recommended a
book that some faculty believed to condone homophobic views; they called for the librarian’s termination. The librarian eventually resigned but thereafter filed an action in federal court alleging a
violation of his First Amendment rights. The court found that the librarian’s speech—the book recommendation that discussed homosexuality—addressed a matter of public concern but was made
pursuant to his official duties, thus not protected by the First Amendment under Garcetti. Id. at 717.
Further, the district court indicated that while the Supreme Court in Garcetti had not resolved
whether academic expression, other than perhaps scholarship and classroom teaching, was constitu-
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In Hong, Renken, Gorum, and Abcarian, the alleged academic
speech at issue did not draw a direct connection to scholarship or teaching, but rather was aligned with quasi-administrative matters. The speech
at issue in Hong may make the best argument for some scholarly or
teaching affiliation, as Professor Hong’s expression dealt with the appointment of lecturers versus fulltime tenured faculty to teach certain
classes. However, the court characterized Professor Hong’s speech as a
matter regarding “internal departmental staffing and administration,”
which constituted unprotected speech.252
These decisions suggest that while the work performed by faculty is
indeed multifaceted, academic freedom does not protect speech that lacks
a well-defined academic or scholarly nexus. At best, in cases such as
Hong, Renken, Gorum, and Abcarian, where faculty are not speaking
purely within their professorial job responsibilities of teaching and
scholarship, but are speaking pursuant to administrative or managerial
functions that they are professionally obligated to perform and that touch
upon internal administrative and non-academic matters, courts appear
willing to apply Garcetti and assess the speech as outside the realm of
academic-freedom protection. From this standpoint, Garcetti can be construed as an extension of Connick granting the public employers wide
latitude to manage public sector organizations.253
While academic speech that centers on core academic functions is
likely to enjoy academic-freedom protection, and academic speech loosely connected to core academic functions involving quasi-administrative
activities is less likely to receive academic-freedom protection under the
First Amendment in the wake of Garcetti, it is worth noting that certain
faculty utterances are wholly undeserving of academic-freedom protection. The Seventh Circuit examined a university’s decision to take action
regarding a faculty member’s involvement in certain controversial acts of
expression. In Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College,254 a part-time community college instructor gave a homosexual student enrolled in her cosmetology class religious pamphlets that espoused the sinfulness of homosexuality.255 The college admonished the instructor in writing and directed her to cease the behavior, which was considered a violation of the
college’s sexual harassment policy.256 A year later, the college notified
tionally protected, the librarian’s speech that concerned neither scholarship nor teaching was not
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 718.
252. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
253. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see also text accompanying notes 146–48.
254. 464 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006).
255. Id. at 671.
256. Id. at 669.
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the instructor that she would not be offered a teaching contract to remain
employed with the institution.257 The faculty member brought suit claiming a violation of her free speech rights in addition to other various constitutional violations.258
The faculty member’s case failed, but it provided an opportunity for
the court to discuss the importance of the Garcetti decision. According to
the court, Garcetti highlights concern for the importance accorded to
public-sector employer’s interests.259 The faculty member’s free speech
concerns were deemed subordinate to the community college’s instructional objectives because “the college had an interest in ensuring that its
instructors stay on message . . . .”260 While faculty views on assigned
course subject matter are indeed protected speech, the instructor’s speech
in the instant case, verbal and through the religious pamphlets, was not
related to instructing the students on the course subject matter—
cosmetology.261 Hence, the speech was not constitutionally protected,
and the college was empowered to take remedial measures in response to
the unprotected speech.262
A tenured mathematics professor at Kansas State University, John
Heublein, was the subject of complaints from students and fellow faculty
members regarding alleged sarcastic remarks and discourteous behavior
in Heublein v. Wefald.263 Following an administrative appeal to the provost and a grievance hearing as provided by the university handbooks, the
associate dean for academics, defendant David Delker, required that
Heublein comply with various corrective measures.264 In response, Heublein filed a lawsuit alleging due process and free speech violations.265
The free speech claim focused on statements made by Professor
Heublein in class and outside the classroom. In this case, the court applied Garcetti only to speech uttered outside the classroom setting because the Supreme Court left undecided whether the Garcetti standard
would apply to classroom teaching.266 The court dismissed the free

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 672.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 784 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Kan. 2011).
264. Id. at 1190.
265. Id. at 1192.
266. Id. at 1197 n.34.
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speech claim and ruled that Professor Heublein failed to satisfy the Garcetti test.267
Piggee and Heublein offer examples of faculty speech that compel
college and university administrators to manage their academic workforce. Because faculty are given unique access to students and a platform
from which to teach and express scholarly views, when that access is
abused for non-academic purposes, academic freedom should grant no
protection to speech that harbors misconduct.
A view of post-Garcetti jurisprudence suggests that lower courts
are prepared to determine that academic speech outside of teaching or
scholarly functions, but within the scope of a faculty member’s professional duties, may be beyond the protective reach of the First Amendment. However, when the speech at issue is related to scholarship or
teaching, the Pickering-Connick analytical framework shall remain applicable to resolve public sector free speech claims. This raises important
questions about the scope of academic speech and the consequences of
academic freedom denied to professorial speech in forums outside of
scholarship and teaching. What are the official duties of a professor employed at a public university, and what speech offered in the course of
performing those official job duties is not entitled to First Amendment
protection? Justice Kennedy warned that certain academic speech may be
entitled to constitutional protection, but scarce guidance exists regarding
application of the Garcetti rationale to the public university scholar. Perhaps a better understanding of the modern day professoriate is necessary.
IV. PROFESSORIAL OBLIGATIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
A disturbing concern generated by the Garcetti decision is that the
“official duties” analysis could be viewed as diminishing academicfreedom protections to the extent that faculty are not distinguished from
the vast ranks of public employees. Whether the work of the college professor centers on teaching, research, or service, these activities represent
the faculty member’s official duties and may constitute unprotected

267. Id. at 1198. Specifically, the court characterized Garcetti as a four-part test: (1) whether
the employee was speaking pursuant to his official duties; (2) whether the employee’s speech can be
fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the employee’s
interest in commenting upon matters of public concern outweigh the state’s interest, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it renders; and (4) whether the employee’s speech
was the motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Id. Interestingly, the court did not
reconcile the elements of this four-part test with Justice Kennedy’s holding on behalf of the Garcetti
majority. Rather, the court observed that Professor Heublein did not meet the second prong of the
test. Id.
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speech, unless Justice Kennedy’s caveat268 affirms fundamental protection for academic speech. Whether the Supreme Court is prepared to
carve out a rule that confirms that academic freedom remains a special
concern of the Constitution that extends First Amendment protection
post-Garcetti may ultimately depend on a better understanding of the
American professoriate.
A noteworthy observation regarding professorial obligations in the
classroom is revealed in an essay prepared by Professor Leonard V.
Kaplan from the University of Wisconsin Law School. In 2007, Professor Kaplan was involved in a controversy surrounding comments raised
during his legal process class in which he discussed the problems experienced by the Hmong people who immigrated to Wisconsin.269 While Professor Kaplan’s comments during the class were intended to advance the
study of legal formalism, some took offense and Professor Kaplan expressed regret for his statements. However, Professor Kaplan pointed out
that the controversy ignited by his legal process class unveiled important
principles regarding the professor’s role and the obligations of educational institutions. For instance, Professor Kaplan submitted that “[i]t is a
law school’s obligation to provide an environment in which faculty can
address and teach students how to assess volatile issues.”270 In the legal
process class at issue, an attempt was made to examine the inadequacy of
legal formalism through the trials and tribulations of a new immigrant
group in an American community. The fact that the intended teachable
moment became lost in controversy reveals the importance of the professor’s role. Addressing the professoriate directly, Professor Kaplan offered the following:
We have an obligation to our students. We best meet that obligation
by showing legal principles at work in difficult and controversial
settings. We are all harmed if professors avoid controversial materials in deference to some accepted or imposed correctness or an apprehension that a topic may offend sensitivities. The law inevitably
must resolve questions that many find offensive. If law professors
avoid these questions, they no longer teach law. Most of us want security and to be left alone. Learning to question assumptions and
values can be painful. But if professors avoid certain issues because
they might offend someone’s sensitivities, we will cease to be a university in all but name . . . . I also think that professors are losing

268. See supra text accompanying notes 17–20.
269. Leonard V. Kaplan, Teaching, Principles and the Role of the Professor, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Dec. 14, 2007), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/12/14/kaplan.
270. Id.
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authority, in part by failing to raise these difficult issues. Academic
literature has been cautioning about what has been called the twilight of authority. Law students are in danger of becoming mere
consumers and not students, law professors of becoming entertainers and not teachers.271

Professor Kaplan’s essay, while offered from the perspective of a
legal educator, speaks to the duty of the professoriate and how the potential failure of professors represents nothing less than the university’s demise.
Also, there is evidence to suggest that the state of the professoriate
is in decline. In a survey of full-time faculty published by Schuster and
Finkelstein in 2006, a rising percentage of faculty believed that respect
for the profession had deteriorated.272 The study indicated that 83.9% of
faculty in 1969 felt free to express relevant views in the classroom as
compared to only 62.9% in 1998.273 Further, there is reason to believe
that administrators are considered less likely to support academic freedom. In 1969, 76.1% of faculty surveyed indicated that academic freedom was supported by the administration but in 1997, only 55.3% of
full-time faculty members surveyed believed academic freedom was
supported by the administration.274 These perspectives may be the outgrowth of various concerns regarding the impact of controversial faculty
speech. Moreover, in the context of the perceived decline of the American professoriate, Garcetti may signal an uncertain future for academicfreedom protections.
A. The Ward Churchill Example: Lessons from the Debacle
The impact of the Garcetti decision on academic speech may be
better understood through faculty speech examples that illuminate the
scope of faculty work. In particular, because Garcetti concerns the legality of disciplinary action imposed against a public sector employee and
has unique implications for professorial work at public academic institutions, the decision triggers difficult questions regarding academic speech.
This may be especially troubling for faculty speech on contentious topics.
Consider the controversial essay Some People Push Back: On the
Justice of Roosting Chickens, written by University of Colorado profes271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. JACK H. SCHUSTER & MARTIN J. FINKELSTEIN, THE AMERICAN FACULTY: THE
RESTRUCTURING OF ACADEMIC WORK AND CAREERS 137 (2006).
273. Id. at Figure 5.5.
274. Id. at 137.
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sor Ward Churchill shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The essay criticizes America’s economic and foreign policies, and
compares some victims in the World Trade Center attack to “little Eichmanns” after the Nazi Adolf Eichmann who was responsible for orchestrating the extermination of European Jews in World War II. 275 Specifically, the essay provides, in part, the following:
Well, really. Let’s get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were
civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a
technocratic corps at the very heart of America’s global financial
empire – the “mighty engine of profit” to which the military dimension of U.S. policy has always been enslaved—and they did so both
willingly and knowingly. Recourse to “ignorance”—a derivative,
after all, of the word “ignore”—counts as less than an excuse
among this relatively well-educated elite. To the extent that any of
them were unaware of the costs and consequences to others of what
they were involved in—and in many cases excelling at—It was because of their absolute refusal to see. More likely, it was because
they were too busy braying, incessantly and self-importantly, into
their cell phones, arranging power lunches and stock transactions,
each of which translated, conveniently out of sight, mind and smelling distance, into the starved and rotting flesh of infants. If there
was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting
some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns
inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be interested in hearing about it.276

In 2005, Professor Churchill’s essay garnered national attention following a decision by Hamilton University to rescind an invitation to Professor Churchill to participate on an academic panel.277 Several professors at Hamilton University objected to Professor Churchill’s views,
which led to increased media attention, and university officials received
more than 6,000 messages protesting Professor Churchill’s appearance.278 Further reaction led the Board of Regents for the University of
Colorado to call a special meeting wherein the board passed a resolution
ordering an investigation to determine whether Professor Churchill
275. Felisa Cardona, Churchill Wins CU Suit, but Awarded Just $1, DENVER POST (Aug. 20,
2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_12055632.
276. Ward Churchill, “Some People Push Back”: On the Justice of Roosting Chickens,
KERSPLEBEDEB.COM, http://kersplebedeb.com/mystuff/s11/churchill.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2013).
277. Jennifer Elrod, Critical Inquiry: A Tool for Protecting the Dissident Professor’s Academic
Freedom, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2008).
278. Patrick Healy, College Cancels Speech over 9/11 Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/education/02hamilton.html?pagewanted=all&position=&_r=0.
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should be dismissed from his position as a tenured faculty member and
chair of the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of Colorado,
Boulder.279
Subsequently, a protracted battle ensued between the University of
Colorado and Professor Churchill that led to a formal investigation of
Professor Churchill’s comments related to the September 11th attacks.280
Following a lengthy investigation, the University of Colorado Board of
Regents decided to terminate Professor Churchill from his tenured position for cause, asserting that he engaged in research misconduct including plagiarism, fabrication, and falsification.281 Professor Churchill immediately sued the university for wrongful discharge and sought reinstatement.282
Professor Churchill’s alleged acts of research misconduct may have
been a compelling issue for the University of Colorado, but his speech
that compared the 9/11 victims to the Nazis is what drew public criticism
to Professor Churchill. Was Professor Churchill’s speech within the
scope of his “official job duties?” To the extent that Professor Church279. Press Release, Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, CU Board of Regents to Hold Special Meeting,
Jan. 30, 2005, available at http:// www.colorado.edu/news/releases/2005/39.html.
280. WARD CHURCHILL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON
RESEARCH MISCONDUCT (2006), available at https://portfolio.du.edu/portfolio/getportfoliofile?
uid=141203; Terry Smith, Speaking Against Norms: Public Discourse and the Economy of Racialization in the Workplace, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 523, 552 (2008).
281. The scope of the university’s investigation was extensive and included all of Churchill’s
writings and public statement. In the final analysis, Churchill was not dismissed for his controversial
9/11 comments but for his academic misconduct. See Elrod, supra note 277, at 1676.
282. In April 2009, a Denver jury unanimously decided in Ward Churchill’s favor finding that
he was terminated in retaliation for his controversial essay about the September 11, 2001, terrorists
attacks which was protected free speech. The jury awarded $1 in damages. Subsequently, on posttrial motions by both parties, the district court vacated the jury’s verdict finding that the defendants
were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity and denied Churchill’s motion for reinstatement and front
pay. The court found that even if equitable remedies were permissible, reinstatement would be inappropriate given that Churchill’s relationship with the university was irreparably damaged and that
reinstatement would likely result in undue interference with the academic process. The district
court’s decision was upheld on appeal and Churchill sought review by the Colorado Supreme Court.
See Cardona, supra note 275; Valerie Richardson, Jury Says Professor Wrongly Booted, WASH.
TIMES (Apr. 3, 2009), http://p.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/apr/3/jury-says-professor-waswrongly-booted/print/. On September 10, 2012, the Colorado Supreme Court re-affirmed the previous district court and appellate court decisions. The Colorado Supreme Court held that (1) the university, standing in the shoes of its board of regents, by stipulation, could properly raise regents’s
personal immunity defenses; (2) the regents’s decision to terminate Churchill was a quasi-judicial
decision, and therefore, the regents were entitled to absolute immunity regarding suits involving
Churchill’s termination; (3) Churchill was not entitled to reinstatement or front pay, despite the
jury’s finding that his termination was retaliatory; and (4) the regents were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of retaliatory employment investigation. Churchill filed a petition for the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear his case, however it denied certiorari. Churchill v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder,
285 P.3d 986 (Colo. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1724 (2013).
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ill’s speech focused on his view of U.S. economic and foreign policy, the
answer would be yes, but whether Garcetti would impose disciplinary
action is uncertain. The matter may hinge on the link between the speech
and Professor Churchill’s academic scholarship or teaching. Without an
adequate academic foundation, academic freedom should provide no
sanctuary for unchecked faculty speech, and Garcetti may authorize administrative action for such unprotected speech. But knowing what is and
what is not entitled to academic-freedom protection may be difficult for
faculty to determine. Academics may become reluctant to speak publicly
at conferences or symposiums on any topic, fearing reprisals for speech
that fails to fall within Justice Kennedy’s caveat cited in Garcetti. Therefore, Garcetti can be viewed as a wake-up call for academics and institutions to clarify their support for academic freedom and define the umbrella of protection available to faculty.
Applying the post-Garcetti case law to circumstances such as those
found in the Churchill matter, it is likely that the analysis utilized in Adams would be most relevant. In Adams, the court determined that a professor’s writings in books and commentaries constituted protected speech
in spite of its conservative tone on political and social issues.283 Churchill’s essay that criticized American economic and foreign policy might be
considered core academic speech subject to scrutiny pursuant to Pickering balancing; however, it should be observed that Churchill’s scathing
reference to the 9/11 victims as “little Eichmanns” could so undermine
the university’s teaching mission that it is undeserving of First Amendment protection because it is outside the realm of academic discourse.
From this standpoint, Garcetti would be applicable. Under either approach, specific clarification regarding the scope of academic-freedom
protection relative to teaching and scholarship would be beneficial to
lower courts.
B. The John Yoo Example: The Faculty Voice and Its Range
Recall that in Sweezy, the Supreme Court noted that
“[t]eachers . . . must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.”284 Academics and professors at American universities are typically offered a broad set of parameters for teaching and
scholarly purposes, and dread the consequences that might flow from any
real or perceived bar on individual faculty academic freedom. At the
283. Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 555–56 (4th Cir. 2011).
284. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (emphasis added).
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University of California Law School, Professor John Yoo took a leave of
absence after earning tenure in 1999 to serve as a government lawyer in
the Department of Justice in the Bush Administration.285 While it is possible that Professor Yoo joined the Department of Justice to gain new
maturity and understanding about the practice of law to enhance his
skills and knowledge as a legal educator, he may be best known for the
role he played in justifying the Bush Administration’s policy in the War
on Terrorism.
Professor Yoo is credited for writing a 2002 interrogation opinion
known as the Torture Memos.286 The memos advised the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the President on the use
of mental and physical torment and coercion to obtain information. The
methods included prolonged sleep deprivation, binding in stress positions, and water-boarding. While these acts are widely regarded as torture in the international community, the Torture Memos claimed that
these activities might be legally permissible under an expansive interpretation of the Presidential authority during the War on Terrorism. Yoo
further argued that the President was not bound by the War Crimes
Act,287 thereby providing a legal opinion backing the Bush Administration’s warrantless wiretapping programs
Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as U.S. Navy General
Counsel Alberta Mora, argued that Professor Yoo’s views were extremist
and represented “catastrophically poor legal reasoning,” criticizing Professor Yoo’s arguments as a violation of the Geneva Convention.288 Also,
once the Torture Memos became public in 2004, they were repudiated by
conservatives such as Jack Goldsmith, the head of the Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC), a division within the Department of Justice responsible
for advising the President on the limits of executive powers.289 Although
285. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Torture Memos and Academic Freedom UC Berkeley Law
School, BERKLEY L. (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/news/2008/edley041008.html.
286. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R.
GONZALES, RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A
(2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf [hereinafter Torture Memo] (memorandum signed by Jay S. Bybee, the U.S. Assistant Attorney General, but generally understood to be written by Yoo); see also Joseph Marchesano, Where Lawfare Meets Lawsuit
in the Case of Padilla v. Yoo, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1575 (2011).
287. Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warnings, NEWSWEEK (May 16, 2004),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/05/16/memos-reveal-war-crimes-warnings.html.
288. Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/archive
/2006/02/27/060227fa_fact.
289. Jeffrey Rosen, Conscience of a Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/magazine/09rosen.html; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, TERROR
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 9, 143–144 (2007).
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the Bush Administration initially relied upon the Torture Memos, the
election of Barack Obama resulted in the new administration’s decision
to immediately rescind all the OLC’s guidance on interrogation and surveillance policy.290
Since leaving the Department of Justice, Professor Yoo has been
subject to extensive questions and scrutiny regarding the Torture Memos.
In 2009, Professor Yoo was called to testify before the House Judiciary
Committee about his work at the Justice Department.291 Furthermore, the
Justice Department ethics unit, the Office of Professional Responsibility
(OPR), initiated an investigation into Professor Yoo’s role in developing
a legal justification for water-boarding and other harsh interrogation
methods.292 Some media reports indicated that the OPR investigation
would determine that Professor Yoo engaged in intentional misconduct.293 However, the final report determined that Professor Yoo and others merely exercised poor judgment.294
Also, a debate ensued at the University of California as to whether
disciplinary action should be taken against Professor Yoo for his role in
the Torture Memos. Some believe that academic freedom should be used
as a shield to those engaged in unethical activities and professional misconduct. On the other hand, universities are not equipped to respond to
the wide array of outside ventures that result in public complaints about a
controversial professor. As a general proposition, Professor Yoo’s leave
of absence to join the Justice Department enhanced his ability in the
classroom and as a scholar upon his return to the University of California, Berkeley law school.295 Institutional support for externships, sabbaticals, or professional leave is routinely granted to faculty for academic
purposes. As such, Professor Yoo’s work on the Torture Memos while at
the Justice Department may well be within the reach of academic290. Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-01-27/pdf/E9-1885.pdf.
291. Dan Eggen, Bush Policy Authors Defend Their Actions, WASH. POST (June 27, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/26/AR200806260196 6_pf.html.
292. Scott Shane, Justice Dept. to Critique Interrogation Methods Backed by Bush Team, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/us/17justice.html.
293. Michael Isikoff, Report: Bush Lawyer Said President Could Order Civilians to Be ‘Massacred’, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/blogs/declassified/
2010/02/19/report-bush-lawyer-said-president-could-order-civilians-to-be-massacred.html.
294. Michael Isikoff & Daniel Klaidman, Justice Official Clears Bush Lawyers in Torture
Memo Probe, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/
blogs/declassified/2010/01/29/justice-official-clears-bush-lawyers-in-torture-memo-probe.html.
295. See generally Richard Byrne, Scholars See Need to Redefine and Protect Academic Freedom, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 7, 2008), http://chronicle.com/article/Scholars-See-Needto-Redefine/661 (discussing attacks on academic freedom and need for a strong response by scholars).
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freedom protection if the academic leave was indeed granted to influence
his teaching and scholarship.
To the extent that Professor Yoo enjoyed academic freedom before
his leave of absence, it is difficult to pinpoint at what point he ceased to
have academic-freedom protection once joining the Justice Department.
In sum, Professor Yoo’s situation provides a wonderful example of how
professorial work differs in complexity and scope from other public sector jobs (e.g., city manager, police officer, tax assessor, etc.). Moreover,
given that Professor Yoo was not convicted of any illegal activity, academic freedom is difficult to deny. To do so would likely discourage
faculty from gaining new insight and perspective that can be attained
through external outreach and ventures outside the college campus.
In cases such as Renken and Abcarian, academic freedom was unavailable to the faculty members because their speech involved official
duties of a managerial nature—administrating a National Science Foundation grant and management of a medical college, respectively. Also, an
initial survey of Professor Yoo’s case might indicate that academicfreedom protection is improper because his work at the Justice Department was not an academic matter but rather the official duties of a professional government lawyer. However, professors take leave from their
on-campus academic work frequently to gain practical experience to
augment their scholarship and classroom teaching. In this context, Garcetti would not appear to apply.
Faculty speech that triggers an emotional response, such as Professor Churchill’s reference to September 11th victims as “little Eichmanns,” or speech that may be criticized as politically partisan and illfounded, such as Professor Yoo’s Torture Memos, present a tempting
opportunity for college and university administrators to impose disciplinary actions or sanction faculty for this type of speech. But academics
must be allowed the latitude to express themselves on matters that are
perhaps controversial. Of course, speech that creates a hostile work environment—gender or racial slurs, profanity, etc.—or speech that unduly
interferes with the operations of the institution ought not receive academic-freedom protection. Unfortunately, Garcetti does not clearly distinguish faculty from other public employees, although it offers an optimistic view that speech regarding classroom instruction and scholarship
might be entitled to constitutional protection.
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V. A CONCEPTION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM GOING FORWARD
A. The Value of the Garcetti Caveat
At the close of the Garcetti majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
states that “[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic
scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional
interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech jurisprudence.”296 While somewhat vague, this caveat appears to signal that academic freedom, as a constitutional protection, may
be sustainable for faculty at public colleges and universities. Lower
courts seem to agree, however, that the Garcetti caveat leaves various
questions regarding academic freedom unsettled that will require substantial consideration from the courts going forward.
For instance, the Garcetti caveat indicates that speech regarding
scholarship and teaching may be entitled to constitutional protection but
is silent as to speech related to university governance and public service.
Confining academic-freedom protection to expression related to scholarship and classroom teaching arguably may be too narrow to adequately
protect the legitimate role faculty should play in the higher education
community. Also, the Garcetti caveat leaves uncertain under what circumstances the majority’s “official duties” analysis applies to academic
speech, and some courts have shared this concern and been reluctant to
apply Garcetti.297 Thus, future decisions relying on Garcetti regarding
the breadth of academic-freedom protection, especially in matters that do
not exclusively involve teaching or scholarship, may be significantly inconsistent.298

296. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
297. See Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that Garcetti does
not necessarily apply in cases involving speech related to scholarship and teaching); Evans-Marshall
v. Bd. of Educ., No. 3:03cv091, 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D. Ohio July 30, 2008), aff’d, 624 F.3d 332
(6th Cir. 2010); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Valley Career Ctr., 451 F. Supp. 2d 905, 929 (N.D. Ohio
2006).
298. Moreover, clarification of the Garcetti caveat may not be forthcoming for political reasons. Only two of the dissenters to the 2006 Garcetti decision, Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer,
remain on the Supreme Court. Justice Souter’s departure is particularly noteworthy in light of his
concerns that the Garcetti majority “does not mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties.’” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 438 (citation omitted). For these reasons, the
value of the Garcetti caveat is best understood as a signpost that individual academic freedom remains a precarious topic in higher education.
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B. Academic Freedom and Professorial Responsibility
In recent years, Garcetti’s impact on higher education has been examined relative to institutional governance, as well as the decision’s influence on the general meaning and strength of academic freedom.299
While academic freedom may have been best served by the U.S. Supreme Court’s admonition that academic freedom is a special concern of
the First Amendment, Garcetti, at the very least, has given many pause
to wonder about the future of academic freedom. Certainly, there are
those who believe that academic freedom provides nothing but a cloak or
pretext that allows faculty to use their academic position as a platform to
engage in mischief by expressing themselves on matters that have no
academic foundation.
Consider the March 2011 open records request by the Wisconsin
Republican Party’s Deputy Executive Director Stephen Thompson for
email records of University of Wisconsin Professor Bill Cronon.300 The
GOP’s request for Professor Cronon’s email records was made while the
state of Wisconsin was receiving national and international media attention over an ongoing budget controversy that placed the state’s Republican governor at odds with Democrats in the legislature. Finding the Republican Party’s open records request authorized by state law, University
of Wisconsin at Madison Chancellor Biddy Martin indicated that “the
university would comply with the law and . . . apply the kind of balancing test that the law allows, taking such things as right to privacy and
free expression into account.”301 In complying with the open records request, the university withheld certain materials in the interests of academic freedom as announced by Chancellor Martin:
We are . . . excluding what we consider to be the private email exchanges among scholars that fall within the orbit of academic freedom and all that is entailed by it. Academic freedom is the freedom
to pursue knowledge and develop lines of argument without fear of
reprisal for controversial findings and without the premature disclosure of those ideas.
Scholars and scientists pursue knowledge by way of open intellectual exchange. Without a zone of privacy within which to conduct
and protect their work, scholars would not be able to produce new
knowledge or make life-enhancing discoveries. Lively, even heated
299. See Areen, supra note 250; Cope, supra note 152; O’Neil, supra note 129.
300. Don Walker, GOP Fails to Get All Professor’s Email, J. SENTINEL ONLINE (Apr. 1,
2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119103214.html.
301. Chancellor’s Message on Academic Freedom and Open Records, UNIV. OF WISMADISON NEWS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.news.wisc.edu/19190.
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and acrimonious debates over policy, campus and otherwise, as well
as more narrowly defined disciplinary matters are essential elements
of an intellectual environment and such debates are the very definition of the Wisconsin Idea.
When faculty members use email or any other medium to develop
and share their thoughts with one another, they must be able to assume a right to the privacy of those exchanges, barring violations of
state law or university policy. Having every exchange of ideas subject to public exposure puts academic freedom in peril and threatens
the processes by which knowledge is created. The consequence for
our state will be the loss of the most talented and creative faculty
who will choose to leave for universities where collegial exchange
and the development of ideas can be undertaken without fear of
premature exposure or reprisal for unpopular positions.
This does not mean that scholars can be irresponsible in the use of
state and university resources or the exercise of academic freedom.
To our faculty, I say: Continue to ask difficult questions, explore
unpopular lines of thought and exercise your academic freedom, regardless of your point of view. As always, we will take our cue
from the bronze plaque on the walls of Bascom Hall. It calls for the
“continual and fearless sifting and winnowing” of ideas. It is our
tradition, our defining value, and the way to a better society.302

Although Chancellor Martin’s message represents the University of
Wisconsin, it is likely embraced at colleges and universities throughout
the nation.
Besides the endorsement for academic freedom, Martin’s message
rejects the irresponsible exercise of academic freedom or the pursuit of
unpopular lines of thought that have no linkage to scholarly exploration.
Academic freedom is not free and all speech is not protected. Professors
and academics are granted an expanded level of freedom as part of their
employment, but that freedom is accompanied by a heightened level of
trust and duty. When that trust and duty are breached, no academicfreedom protection is available. But how to evaluate the breach of that
trust/duty covenant is the challenge.
At Northwestern University, Professor John Michael Bailey invited
students in his human sexuality course to observe a live in-class sex
demonstration. He was initially supported by university officials, who
said “[t]he university supports the efforts of its faculty to further the ad-

302. Id.
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vancement of knowledge.”303 Further, a university spokesperson indicated that “Northwestern University faculty members engage in teaching
and research on a wide variety of topics, some of them controversial.”304
As news spread that about 100 students actually watched a man penetrate
a woman with an electric-powered device, the university was compelled
to explain its dismay with the incident and directed a full investigation.305
Reacting to the professor’s decision to permit the in-class sex
demonstration, Northwestern University President Morton Schapiro stated, “I feel it represented extremely poor judgment on the part of our faculty member . . . . I simply do not believe this was appropriate, necessary
or in keeping with Northwestern University’s academic mission.”306
President Schapiro’s comments, like those of Chancellor Martin’s,
strike at the core professorial function—advancing the university’s academic mission without abandoning the institution’s responsibility to embrace ethical and professional standards. The University of Wisconsin
was prepared to withhold information in the interest of protecting materials that, if disclosed, would place academic freedom in peril. Northwestern University may refuse to recognize academic freedom as a shield to
insulate a professor from disciplinary action because the professor allowed expression that arguably did not constitute an appropriate academic pursuit.
Given the complex array of circumstances that frequently raise academic freedom concerns, Garcetti gingerly confirms that professorial
speech regarding teaching and scholarship remains protected. Beyond
that consideration, faculty speech regarding administrative matters or
quasi-administrative matters is less likely to receive protection. Without
question, a burden is placed on individual faculty to police themselves,
especially when their speech lacks a firm academic foundation.
While more guidance is welcome from the Supreme Court regarding what academic speech is constitutionally protected and to what extent, American higher education would also be well served by taking the
initiative and defining individual academic freedom for itself. If these
primary stakeholders are unable define academic freedom in some meaningful fashion, perhaps the courts will continue address academic freedom in bits, pieces, and caveats. Again, Garcetti and the post-Garcetti
303. Kevin Helliker, College Condemns Classroom Sex Show, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 6, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703752404576178791072808496.html.
304. Id.
305. Kara Spak, Live Sex Demonstration Troubles, Disappoints Northwestern President,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.suntimes.com/4115230-417/northwesternpresident-troubled-over-live-sex-demonstration.html.
306. Id.
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cases should serve notice that the scope of individual academic freedom
requires renewed clarification, which will only benefit the American
higher education system.
VI. CONCLUSION
While colleges and universities are complex organizations that depend on contributions from various skilled and dedicated professionals,
the academic faculty plays a vital role in the mission of any higher education institution. Professors rely on academic freedom to pursue their
work without the threat of retaliatory disciplinary action influencing their
teaching or research. The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti raises
important questions regarding free speech and the scope of academicfreedom protection. The post-Garcetti case law appears to unveil a distinction as to speech that centers on core academic matters, such as
teaching and scholarship, verses speech that involves administrative and
managerial concerns. Although academic freedom has been characterized
as a difficult concept to define, Garcetti has provided an opportunity for
the judiciary, as well as institutions of higher education, to re-examine
academic freedom and the protections available to individual professors
and faculty members.

